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ABSTRACT  
 
Differentiation between public and private goods is very complex and difficult. In this article, 
authors overview these definitions and also the theories about private and public goods to apply this 
knowledge in the determination of the social welfare functions of forests, the utilization and the 
tasks of the government. The welfare functions of forests, the tasks of the owner and also the way of 
utilization of the forest is differing between public and private forests. This overview can help to 
determine these functions and tasks and also find the best ways of utilization.  
Keywords: Social welfare, Private and public goods, Government  
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
While we studying the social welfare functions of forests, we regularly have to face 
with questions that economically difficult to consider. In case of private forests, the 
owner or user information, individual preferences, short and long-term economic 
interests will help a lot in the choice of the forest utilization, and also in the 
combination of different possibilities that do not exclude each other. In case of 
forests owned or used by the state the situation is basically different, because 
besides the economical criteria of forest utilization other macro economic and 
social factors have to be considered. These include for example the protection of 
natural environment, national wealth and national values, protection of historical 
relics, the role of tourism in preservation of health, the love of nature and also the 
education of patriotism or just the increase of people’s happiness and well-being 
without the measurable increase of GDP. It can be an important task to involve the 
public goods of private forests (for example blue hiking trail, a part in private 
forest) in free of charge with the help of the state.  
It does not offer solution for the above mentioned problem, but it helps to 
understand it if we overview the theoretical definition of the economic 
characteristics of certain goods (particularly the public goods). We reviewed some 
important steps of reference systems in the history of economical theories and also 
how they can support the making of optimal social decisions. Finally, we return to 
the starting point and look over how they are applicable in the economical award of 
social welfare utilization of the forests.  
 
Regional and Business Studies (2014) Vol 6 No 1, 13-23 
Kaposvár University, Faculty of Economic Science, Kaposvár 
Seregi et al.: The social welfare function of forests in the light of the theory of public goods  
 14 
2. THEORIES ABOUT THE DISTINCTION OF PRIVATE AND 
PUBLIC GOODS  
 
The distinction between private and public goods is a substantive issue in the terms 
of establishing the extent and budged of the government involvement. If we can 
decide irrefutably that something is private or public good, the necessity of state or 
non-state implementation can be clearly assigned. The question is actually occurs in 
transition states: how government participates in the establishment of these? (Of 
course, we are aware that to answer this and also the actual construction, never 
withdrawal from the rights required in the past, can be a barrier of clear economic–
rational–consideration.)  
Review the historical alternation of the definition of public good (Blankart, 
2011). Already SAX from the late Kameralists, draw attention to appropriate the 
ruler’s incomes to revive (also) economy. At the beginning 20th century 
MAZZOLA and WICKSELL thought the goodness of public good if it was 
available for someone, it was also available for everyone. However WICKSELL 
draw attention to the annoying stowaway behavior that is an optimal strategy 
individually but it occurs as a problem at the social level. The solution would be 
that all the affected sit down and decided to put up the money together. 
LINDAHL (1919) examined how to finance the production of public goods from 
optimal tax. The most people refer to the definitions that SAMUELSON (1954) 
(Samuelson, 1954) and MUSGRAVE (1959) used, later we will describe the 
categories that they used. BUCHANAN (1968) brought change, he regarded 
important the examination of the manners of common-pool resources. His 
innovation was considering the public consumption of public goods, not like the 
previous approaches that classified the goods according to features (rivalry, 
excludability). MALINVAUD and DRÊZE (1970–1971) observed the classification 
according to the features, but basically make a distinction between rivalries; 
excludability was only a secondary element. JOHANSEN (1971), CLARKE and 
GROVES (1971–1973) applied a decision theory approach (Blankart, 2011). In the 
Hungarian literature STIGLITZ (2000) (Stiglitz, 2000) és VÍGVÁRI (2002) (Vígvári, 
2002) had similar statements about the definition of public goods.  
Classification of goods along two dimensions by BLANKART (2001); 
according to MUSGRAVE (1973) Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1  
 
Classification of goods along two equal criteria  
 
 Rivalry Non-rivalry 
Excludability  Private goods (1) Bread, 
flat  
“Toll” goods (3) 
Television, motorway  
Non-excludability  Public goods (2) Fishing, 
downtown streets  
Pure public goods (4) 
Foreign policy  
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To do this classification of certain goods, the decision should be made clearly, for 
example it is characterized by excludability or not, it cannot be said that a „bit” 
excludable. However, for a more analytical work quantifiability–a real scale–needed. 
The tool of measurement can be the marginal cost of the exclude of a non-paying 
consumer (stowaway) or include of a new consumer. If the previous is high 
exclusion is impossible, if the latter is higher we talk about rivalry. It should be 
emphasized that exclusion always means technical exclusion (for example not moral 
exclusion). The only exception is cost-based impracticability, because the costs of it 
exceeded the deficits of stowaway behavior.  
Rivalry can be explained by the features of the certain good. It reduces the 
usefulness of eat an apple if someone eat from that previously, whilst listening to 
the radio is an experience and will not change if someone else listen it, too. Of 
course, sometimes certain facilities or a certain cultural situation determines the 
occurrence of competition. When we brush our teeth with a toothbrush we do not 
like to give it to another person, but if we clean our shoes with it, give it to other 
family members does not mean a problem. For a Hungarian woman monogamy is 
natural, but in the earlier Mormon world “husband consumption” between wives 
did not rival.  
In MUSGRAVE approach state does not related to private goods (1), the 
„invisible hand” serves perfectly in their markets, government should not interfere 
(Musgrave, 1996). Pure public goods (4) (like national defense, flood control, 
environmental protection, protection of private properties, etc. that benefits for all) 
in fact relates to the state, almost it has obligate rights and it has to provide it. 
Private production can work in a non-profit form or in a very small community (see 
1). The other two elements (2 and 3) of the table, the degree of intervention is a 
determinative question, need consideration of the effects of market and 
government failures. Public goods (2) include fishing (though the fact that the 
boundaries of international waters in the shoreline farther tighten, the degree of 
exclusion can be increased the coastal countries). Downtown streets also belong to 
the category of public goods, because no one can be excluded, but the drivers 
competing with each other for parking space. In “toll” goods  
(3) exclusion give space for payment, besides when a motorway is not crowded cars 
do not bother each other, and also does not mean a problem that more people 
watch the television at home.  
ZIMMERMANN and HENKE form groups in one dimension, which creates 
the applicability of simple function analysis (Zimmermann and Henke, 2005). They 
make a distinction between private and public goods along rivalry (in intermediate 
state we can speak about mixed goods), in these categories they make distinction 
according to exclusion (still technical and cost-based) (Figure 2).  
If vaccines are not mandatory, exclusion is made by only those people get it 
who voluntary go to the doctor. At the same time , if the majority vaccinate 
themselves to a communicable disease, the non-vaccinated also protected, because 
the risk of infections become lower, in this way they cannot be excluded from this 
major protection. Lighthouse is a typical good example for pure public goods, 
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because if it helps to a ship in orientation, it would not be less helpful for another 
or not available, it cannot light for just one of them.  
CANSIER and BAYER according to Table 1 create groups in a one dimension 
scale (Cansier and Bayer, 2003).  
 
Figure 2 
 
Degree of rivalry with the subordination of excludability  
 
Rivalry Excludability Non-excludability 
Total  Private goods 
 Car  Crowded street  
Partial  Mixed goods  
Protection of vaccinated  Effect on non-vaccinated  
Negative  Public goods 
 Non crowded motorway  Lighthouse  
 
Table 1  
 
The explanation of mixed goods  
 
Pure private goods 
Mixed goods 
Pure public goods Quasi-private 
goods 
Quasi-public 
goods 
Excludability and 
rivalry  
– Incomplete 
excludability and 
rivalry (private 
goods with extern 
effect)  
– Excludability and 
missing rivalry (club 
goods)  
– Missing 
excludability but 
rivalry  
– Common-Pool 
(public resources)  
Neither exclusion 
nor rivalry  
– Produced goods  
– Natural goods  
 
The quasi (also called practical) private goods include the private goods that have 
external effects. For example, when an old diesel car passes in front of someone he 
cannot exclude himself from its discomfort. Of course, not all effects are bad: when 
a teacher pays for a PowerPoint course he cannot exclude the students from the 
positive effects of it. Club goods are quasi-private goods that have the possibility of 
exclusion, but there is no rivalry in consumption (till the membership does not 
reach an extremly high level). For example, fishing is a quasi-public good such as a 
community resource. In pure public goods we have to differentiate produced and 
natural public goods. Clean air belongs to the latter category, but if pollution takes 
the level when cleaning is necessary it becomes a produced public good.  
BUCHANAN (1968) examined that consumption is private or public (Cullis and 
Jones, 1998). (The problem with this approach is that it does not answer for the 
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question to produce the good individually or commonly.) He examined two 
dimensions. One of them is divisibility; the other is the size of the consuming 
group. Private good is consumed individually (in a very small group), everybody has 
an own part. For example, fire-extinguisher in the hall is a partly divisible good, can 
be consumed in small groups (2). Not everyone needs an own fire-extinguisher till 
the rush does not endanger the fire-fighting. Swimming pool is an example for 
indivisibility (4) that we use individually, but do not parcel it to decide which square 
is whose. Moderately divisible and crowds of people can avail (3) for example 
vaccine (not everyone avails it, but it protects also the others). Pure public goods 
(5) are indivisible and large groups can consume them.  
 
Figure 3  
 
Division of consumption  
 
 
 
Figure 4 and 5 show the demand of private and public goods (according to Cullis and 
Jones, 1998; and Musgrave, 1996). Da and Db mark the demand of ’a’ and ’b’ people’s 
demand for a certain private good, Da + b is the total demand (Da and Db is the 
horizontal amount). Da’ and Db’ show ’a’ and ’b’ people’s marginal propensity to 
pay for a certain public good, Da + b’ is the vertical amount of them. The optimum 
is Da + b = MC and Da + b’ = MC.  
The next Figure 5 is the same with the previous, the only difference is that 
LINDAHL marked the marginal propensity to pay for public goods with D, the 
marginal costs with MC. The effective point (Teff, peff) of public good production, 
and everyone has to pay the amount of tax that is equal with his D besides the 
amount of Teff (in the figure it is pA and pB). The problem with the establishment 
of theoretical balance in practice is that we do not know the preferences of certain 
people and if we ask them they may be say lower D to pay lower tax while they use 
public goods according to their real needs.  
PARETO, KALDOR and HICKS also searched for the balanced solution, they 
assumed a horizontal MC that is usually the same as the price in the optimum. 
Since we cannot divide fairly the costs, simply pay the goods fifty-fifty with the two 
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performers. At this time according to the KALDOR–HICKS criteria, when the 
balance point is the same as LINDAHL, ’A’ comes off badly, because besides Teff 
he pays higher tax than his willingness. ’B’ get in the right position because he 
would be willing to pay more than he has to. Under PARETO-criteria produce the 
amount of TA besides appropriate tax, so the total revenue tariff will be p × TA. 
(This satisfies the conditions of PARETO-efficacy: no one can improve the 
situation of someone without worsen the situation of someone else.) The following 
figure shows these two solutions.  
 
Figure 4  
 
Total demand: public decisions and private goods  
 
 
 
Figure 5  
 
The balanced amount of public goods in case of LINDAHL-tax  
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Figure 6 
 
The balanced amount of public goods in case of lump-sum tax  
 
 
 
Finally, have a look at what will be the overall balance in the production of private 
and public goods (Cansier and Bayer, 2003). In our model, we examined a binominal 
society (’A’ and ’B’ people), one kind of public (T) and one kind of private goods 
(X). Suppose that ’B’ person’s welfare level is given by IB indifference curve. The 
concave curve from the figure above shows the limit opportunities of the 
production of T and X goods, minus IB we get the cd curve in the figure below. 
Since the usefulness of ’B’ is fixed, we get the balance point with the optimization 
of the position of ’A’ that will be in the tangent point of the residual curve and the 
IA indifference curve. Here we produce public goods in ’M’ (they both consume it, 
because there is no rivalry), besides this we can produce ’N’ amount of private 
goods (Figure 5). From this ’N’ unit ’F’ remains for ’B’ (figure above) and remains 
’E’ for ’A’ (Figure 6), because of the derivation of cd, it is true that: N = E + F.  
 
Figure 7  
 
Effective production of private and public goods  
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In the issue of the efficient production of public goods it is unavoidable and also in 
case of „toll” and „public goods” the previously mentioned stowaway effect is a 
frequent problem, so a significant part of the consumers try to use them while they 
brake out themselves from the burden during production.  
Stowaway behavior can be clearly pictured with the game theory of the classical 
situation of prisoner’s dilemma. In this case, the parties concerned make decisions 
about goods production isolated from each other (like separated and separately 
interrogated prisoners). They have to consider that the other can act cooperatively 
or non-cooperatively. Table 2 shows the possible example of the expected values 
structure (Cansier and Bayer, 2003).  
 
Table 2 
 
The profit of A and B in case of different strategies  
 KB B cooperating  NB B non-cooperating  
KA, A cooperating  10/10  -10/12  
NA, A non-cooperating  15/-8  0/0  
 
The given numbers show the result of decision for A and B. For example: A can 
choose a cooperative solution KA or a non-cooperative solution NA, B can also do 
this. Do not cooperate is better, because for A 15 > 10 and 0 > 10, for B 12 > 10 
and 0 > -8, so the dominant strategy will be the non-cooperating. If both of them 
choose the directly favorable solution, the maximal total utility (20 units) will be 
inaccessible for the community. In other words, in case of public goods the so-
called NASH-equilibrium (the strategic point from which the parties have not to 
change, because of supposing the rational behavior of the other) will be the 
stowaway behavior. With fair market conditions, assuming perfect competition 
nobody will produce public goods. The total utility maximum of the society can be 
reached with intervention of non-market (usually state) tools. Of course, the 
dominant strategy will be different, if one of the parties can force his willing to the 
other, or they can control the decisions of each other.  
The theory of public goods can help to economically understand better the theory 
of HOBBES about the state contracts. If we define the freedom rooted in internal 
security as a public good, we can understand why the imagined “natural” state lead to 
anarchy and why it is only stop with the intervention of the state. The case of prisoner’s 
dilemma can be applied well for “natural” state. People only think of their own profit 
and they always insult each other’s interests. Who act cooperatively, abstain from insult 
the other’s interests will suffer disadvantages. Based on the previous game “A” and “B” 
can practice their natural freedom (NA, NB) or they can regard each other (KA, KB), if 
they were at peace with each other, overall it would be better, but the dominant strategy 
will be the fight. HOBBS thinks that the prisoner’s dilemma is solvable at the level of 
arrangement. “B” give up the crossing of interests with the terms that “A” will also do 
this. This agreement can be understood as decentralized consensus quest. HOBBS sees 
the legitimacy of the state that a third party with power is needed who forces “A” and 
“B” to dependably keep the agreement.  
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Interesting exception in case of the few goods or in small communities, public 
goods can be developed without external interference. This can occur if the rate of 
contribution increases more than its realized utility for the consumer. The 
difference between it and private goods is that the utility enjoyed by others. In this 
case, consumers will use the disposal income for purchase till the marginal utility 
exceeded the marginal utility of the use of private goods. In small communities, for 
example in small villages, the other participants’ relatively direct control on each 
other will decrease the possibility of stowaway behavior.  
There is a group of goods that does not fit in the previously examined relation 
system that does not belong to public goods, but the need for government’s 
intervention may occur in allocation. MUSGRAVE used the words meritoric and 
demeritoric goods (Musgrave, 1996).  
We talk about meritoric goods if the amount of consumption is not sufficient 
under pure market conditions. With other words, the amount of individual optimum 
is less than the social optimum. Only those goods are demeritoric that the society–
due to the individual optimization–consumes in a higher amount, than the level that 
is optimal for the community. Use of the seat-belt is a typical example of meritoric 
goods, at the same time traveling by car is demeritoric. The theoretical analyses of 
meritoric goods pay attention to important things. In a scientific way this is not result 
in a clear categorization or such a formal analytic possibility than the previous theory 
of public goods. Later MUSGRAVE also admitted it in an article (Musgrave, 1996). 
There are people who consider the practical consequences drawn from the theory of 
meritoric good very dangerous because governmental intervention to the market 
relations (spending public money and the removal of additional taxes from the 
economy) may occur without its cause and the mechanism of action would be 
sufficiently determined and assessed. Achieving the individual or social optimum 
usually originated in informational asymmetry (the consumer is not aware of danger 
or the long-term consequences, or underestimate them) or in strong external effects 
(benefits and harms appear not only for the consumer who make the decision but for 
everyone) or in the appearance of both effects.  
On pure theoretical base only external effects need allocative governmental 
intervention. Informational problems should be remedied not with providing public 
goods, but for example with informative work. Of course serious questions may 
arise about how the propaganda against smoking and alcohol consumption is 
effective. Or even publishing annual percentage rate of mandatory disclosure how 
much influence the decisions of borrowers.  
Finally, we have to mention that not only the production of public goods can 
occur at the level of private level (not for state order, but entirely without state 
intervention), but it is also frequent that private goods are produced at the level of 
the state or them distribution with governmental tools. A reason for this is the 
above mentioned problem of meritoric goods. Close relation of a certain public 
good or common goods provided by the state or a toll good due to technology or 
traditions also result in the governmental allocation of private goods. For example, 
beside medical services the so-called additionally provided „hotel services” (food, 
accommodation, laundry, etc.) at the hospital. In many places–also in Hungary–an 
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important dilemma of the health care financing reform how these financially two 
different types of services can be separated from each other. On an equitable basis 
it can be tolerated that the quality of hotel services may depend on solvency 
stronger within certain limits than medical service.  
 
3. DISTINCTION OF FORESTS  
 
One of the studies that deal with the economical issue of the free use of Bavarian 
Forest National Park follows the next logical system (Allinger – Guleszkij, 2000). In 
the aspect of allocation it is reasonable if both excludability and rivalry do not exist. 
In case of a national park the exclusion of non-paying visitors is possible, but it has 
very high additional costs du to the technical construction of fencing, access 
control system and further identification. The problem of rivalry also appears 
partly. It should be determined that the increase in the number of visitors which 
kind of extra costs will cause (for example garbage collection). In the analyses it can 
be consider as negligible.  
A significant part of the additional costs is the so-called crowding costs. Due to 
the high number of the visitors the hedonic value (utility) of the tranquility of the 
park and the smooth immersion in nature will decrease. Here, as so often this is not 
a pure public good. The state allocation: decision can be made about establishment 
and use after serious analyses of costs and benefits. 
Free use is appropriate if:  
- The costs resulting from crowed do not appear till the actual needs do not 
guarantee.  
- The costs of toll exceed the losses that can be avoided with the payment.  
The above mentioned BAVARIAN problem also appears in the practice of 
national forest holdings in Hungary. In many cases we found that according to the 
original MUSGRAVE classification neither pure public nor pure private goods are 
concerned. Obviously, there are differences between large forests far from densely 
populated cities, park forests around the cities and the arboretums containing 
special plant rarities.  
In the first case, the realization of exclusion is economically not rational and also 
the establishment of some kind of toll system. If we can achieve with proper 
communication that visitors stay away from activities that directly damages nature, 
the crowding costs related additional–if they are not negligible–but certainly less 
than the costs of exclusion, and also the expected revenues are not likely to could 
financed the additional costs.  
With arboretums the situation is completely different, because the protection of 
the rare plants that they contain (prevention of excessively high additional costs in 
the aspects of economy) alone explains the control of the number of visitors. 
Although in many cases the entrance to arboretums owned by the national forest 
holdings is free (due to social reasons). Thus the costs of exclusion will exceed the 
additional reduction of costs that can achieve. Added to this is also suggested that 
at certain times (for example rhododendron bloom) the demand for visiting 
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arboretums is so high, that it may be appropriate to reduce the payment and also 
due to high demand fees–even modest–can contribute to the maintenance of the 
institution.  
The case of park forests that located near cities is between the previous two 
examples, where the additional costs are outstanding due to the huge number of 
visitors, at the same time due to smaller extent; fencing and the exclusion of 
incompetent visitors are in a technically and economically possible range. It should 
be also consider that what are the health and cultural benefits that regular visits of 
the forests cause and how much it will reduce if it will also act on the solvent 
demand.  
After this problem cannot be solved with positivist approach, application of 
utility variables derived from social preferences are needed, without this only 
premature, shortsighted pro or contra decisions can be made. Significant 
methodological and practical advances can be achieved if the above mentioned 
theoretical, historical problems of public goods production can be applied 
empirically for some partial aspects of social welfare utility of national forest 
holdings in Hungary with the tools of cost-benefit analysis.  
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